There was a time when Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, offered Russia’s membership of Nato as a long-term possibility, and even Putin raised the topic soon after coming to power. But, of course, this membership did not happen – Nato didn’t even take the question seriously. Russia, with its economy, army, finances and even its government all on the verge of collapse, seemed too much of a burden to take on board, not just for Nato, but the west in general.

This may have been a unique moment of opportunity which could have created a different Europe, and perhaps even helped to create a different world. Georgia would not now be lying in ruins, Russia would not be threatening Poland, eastern Europe would be safe, and Russia would be a reliable and predictable partner, perhaps even a better place for its own citizens. But that moment was lost, and there may not be another like it for a very long time to come.

The Russia-Nato council, created in 2002, presided over useful projects, such as common military exercises, cooperation in the fight against terrorism etc, but this was not what Russia had aspired to. By unilaterally deciding to halt its cooperation with Nato, it did not lose much. The west may have – at the moment, it needs Russia more than Russia needs it.

The question of whether this is already a cold war seems inappropriate, when there is a danger of a real “hot” war in the air. Russia has really got the bit between its teeth, and the west seems serious about defending its new partners. Somebody has to pull back, and it would be better if it were Russia: emulating American behaviour in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict would bring it nothing except a complete loss of face – exactly the opposite to what it is trying to achieve. Oil has gone to the head of Russia’s military. Russia it is trying to speak not only to its neighbours but to the west from a position of strength, but oil is leverage, it is not strength.

It may look like Russia is winning the conflict with Georgia. But what will it get in the end? The territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Perhaps not even that. A regime change in Georgia? Maybe, but not very likely. An international tribunal for the “genocidal Georgian regime”? Only if the court sits in Moscow and consists of Russians, Ossetians and Abkhazians. A new-found assertiveness – so that once again Russia’s neighbours are terrified of it? That will certainly be there, but it would not bring respect and would only make them huddle closer to the west. What it certainly will produce is a more xenophobic Russian populace (opinion polls show how anti–Georgian sentiment surged during the few days of the war) and a less tolerant society, something that Russia can ill afford. There will be still less room for an independent media or liberal opinion or political dissent. The military–industrial complex will get even more resources, and the rest of the population will work mostly for it, and not for itself, just as it was in the Soviet days.

The effect of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising on Khruschev’s reforms was devastating. There is hardly any doubt that the effect of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and of its row with the west would have the same effect on whatever hopes for a thaw Medvedev’s ascendancy has brought with it.

It was not Russia that destroyed the post-war international order with its principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was the US which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, began to behave as if these principles no longer existed. But it will be Russia that will reap the bitter fruit if it tries to play the same game.